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THE REGULATORY FRAMEWORK FOR AERIAL IMAGING 
BY RECREATIONAL USERS OF “DRONES” IN SINGAPORE 
Old and Emerging Issues and Some Possible Solutions 
In response to the sudden proliferation of hobbyist 
unmanned aerial vehicles used for digital imaging – or 
“drones”, as they are popularly, but rather inaccurately, 
labelled – the Singapore government enacted the Unmanned 
Aircraft (Public Safety and Security) Act in 2015 and also 
amended various existing laws relating to air navigation. 
However, in view of the rapid evolution in drone technology 
and the ever-expanding range of useful applications brought 
about by drones, what are some of the challenges that would 
be faced when enforcing the law against recreational users of 
aerial imaging in particular, and what are some of the 
changes that should be made to the law when the matter is 
revisited for review in the future? Through an appraisal of the 
current state of drone technology and a comparison with the 
rules that have been adopted in various other jurisdictions 
around the world, this article considers how our existing laws 
on recreational users of drones can be improved, and also 
highlights emerging issues that would eventually warrant 
regulatory attention here and elsewhere. The matters to be 
discussed here include whether limits should be placed on 
distance, speed, and people proximity, whether drones truly 
pose a threat to privacy and other related rights, and how 
drone safety can be enhanced independently of a permits and 
permissions system. 
CHEN Siyuan 
LLB (Hons) (National University of Singapore), LLM (Harvard); 
Assistant Professor of Law, Singapore Management University. 
I. Background and roadmap 
1 Unmanned aerial vehicles, or remotely piloted aircraft, are by 
no measure completely new technologies, but one particular iteration of 
them – ready-to-fly multi-rotor copters equipped with digital 
technology for aerial imaging, and also often given the misleading 
appellation of “drones” – can only be said to have become mainstream 
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and affordable in the last couple of years.1 Because of this development, 
any member of the public is now able to easily purchase and pilot 
something that has had a longstanding association with military 
surveillance and warfare, and recreational and professional users alike 
have been engaging in aerial imaging on this new platform on an 
unprecedented scale.2 In the case of the recreational user, regulation is 
complicated by the fact that because of ease of use and the nature of the 
hobby, drone imaging is inherently a solo activity that often leaves no 
traces – a typical user takes no longer than half an hour to set up, fly, 
take the images, and leave. Should there be any incident that requires 
investigation, it may be difficult to establish the facts, as even witnesses 
may not know who was piloting the drone.3 Moreover, unlike 
commercial operators who have an incentive not to be decertified by the 
authorities of their exploitative rights and are accountable to their 
clients, and social flying clubs which are likely to insist on safe flying 
practices within their ranks, the average drone user operates under no 
such constraints.4 Drone imaging offers spectacular possibilities, and 
with the allure of capturing a photograph that would go “viral” on social 
media, some drone users may be tempted to push the envelope as to 
what is considered safe and responsible. An overly oppressive regulatory 
framework may not necessarily result in compliance in the long run, 
even in Singapore. 
                                                          
1 The Economist, “Suddenly, There are Drones Everywhere” <http://www.economist. 
com/news/science-and-technology/21684685-and-pilots-are-reporting-ever-more-
close-encounters-them-suddenly-there-are> (accessed 5 December 2016). At the 
outset an important disclosure ought to be made: the author is part of a group of 
co-owners of a DJI Inspire 1 Pro (specifications of which will be explained later in 
the article) who are regular contributors to a Facebook page related to drone 
photography and videography in Singapore. However, while the group obviously 
have some vested interest in advocating greater navigational freedom for aerial 
imaging, they are mindful of the need to constantly evaluate the right balance 
between public safety, advancement of technology and individual rights. Moreover, 
adopting an overly permissive regulatory framework would not be in anybody’s 
interests either, as the slightest negative incident is likely to be attributed to lax 
laws and the inexorable result can only be over-regulation that might take a very 
long time to reverse. Being actual and active users of the technology, the group 
have a particular vantage point when analysing the limitations and vulnerabilities 
of the hardware and, concomitantly, the gaps and questionable assumptions in 
the law. 
2 See generally Singapore Parliamentary Debates, Official Report (11 May 2015) 
vol 93. 
3 Relatedly, there was a recent report of a remote-controlled aeroplane that damaged 
the roof of a block of flats, but the operator was never located: Valerie Koh, “High 
Time for Laws to Catch Up on Drones: Experts” Today (16 October 2016). 
4 Henry Perritt & Albert Plawinski, “Making Civilian Drones Safe: Performance 
Standards, Self-Certification, and Post-Sale Data Collection” (2016) 
14(1) Northwestern Journal of Technology and Intellectual Property 1 at 32. 
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2 Countries all over the world have since struggled to find a 
timely, precise and proportionate response in attempting to regulate the 
phenomenon of widespread recreational drone usage, mainly because 
there remains a prevalent – but eminently questionable – assumption 
that drones are either inherently unstable or likely to fall into the hands 
of criminals, and the drones can therefore cause great damage to 
property and people, if not violate privacy and other related rights.5 
Widely reported stories of supposed drone “incidents” – be it drones 
being flown near airports,6 being flown near restricted government 
infrastructure,7 interfering with emergency responders,8 delivering 
drugs to criminals,9 crashing into unsuspecting crowds in high-profile 
events,10 being destroyed by vigilante home-owners,11 being used to 
mount weapons12 or being targeted for use by terrorist groups13 – have 
not helped with improving public opinion either. Drones simply have a 
very bad reputation by virtue of the negative press they regularly receive, 
and the tide does not look like it would turn any time soon.14 The 
benefits of drone technology, be it for the provision of vital public 
services,15 the innovative improvement of commerce16 or the radical 
                                                          
5 See generally Chen Siyuan, “The Regulation of the Recreational Use of ‘Drones’ for 
Aerial Photography and Videography: Comparing Singapore’s Unmanned Aircraft 
Act with Other Legislation” (2015) 33 Sing L Rev 55. 
6 In one infamous incident, what was reported to be a close shave with a drone 
turned out to be a close shave with a plastic bag: Steven Swinford, “Drone Believed 
to Have Hit British Airways Flight ‘May Have Been a Plastic Bag’” The Telegraph 
(21 April 2016). 
7 See for instance Bart Jansen, “Small Drone Crashes Near White House Despite Ban 
Against Flights in DC” USA Today (9 October 2015). 
8 See for instance Dave Lee, “Drone Industry Delight at New US Rules” BBC News 
(22 June 2016). 
9 See for instance Jack Nicas, “Criminals, Terrorists Find Uses for Drones, Raising 
Concerns” The Wall Street Journal (28 January 2015). 
10 See for instance Kevin Rawlinson, “Man Comes Forward After Woman Knocked 
Out by Drone” BBC News (1 July 2015). 
11 See for instance Michael Archambault, “Man Wins Lawsuit Against Neighbour 
Who Shot Down Drone with Shotgun” Peta Pixel (29 June 2015). 
12 See for instance Alex Lockie, “An 18-year-old Mounted a Gun to a Drone and 
Fired Shots in the Middle of the Woods” Business Insider (22 July 2015). 
13 See for instance Ian Johnston, “Terrorists Could Use Drone Bombs to Attack 
Nuclear Power Stations, Experts Warn” Independent (11 January 2016). 
14 Even professional operators, who are supposed to possess the relevant competence 
and certifications, have had their share of high-profile accidents: see for instance 
James Billington, “Deadly Drone Accident Dodged by World Champion Skier 
Marcel Hirscher during Downhill Slalom” International Business Times 
(23 December 2016) and James Lillywhite, “Huge Drone Crashes over London 
Crowd during Muse Gig at the O2” International Business Times (15 April 2016). 
15 See for instance Lester Hio, “Govt Agencies Testing More Than 25 Potential Uses 
of Drones” The Straits Times (5 February 2016). 
16 See for instance Guillaume Thibault & Georges Aoude, “Companies are Turning 
Drones into a Competitive Advantage” Harvard Business Review (29 June 2016). 
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transformation of the media and entertainment industries,17 are simply 
not as newsworthy (and therefore as well known) in comparison. 
3 In Singapore, the Government was quite quick to respond 
legislatively to what it perceived as a growing problem when the 
recreational use of drones – particularly those equipped with digital 
imaging capabilities – became visibly popular in around 2014.18 Indeed, 
the parliamentary debates surrounding the enactment of the Unmanned 
Aircraft (Public Safety and Security) Act19 in 2015 were also telling in 
terms of the Government’s characterisation of the potential issues. 
Although the Minister for Transport who had introduced the Bill to the 
Legislature was quite circumspect in his views in that drone technology 
required a “balanced and sustainable regulatory framework” so as not to 
impede innovation and responsible recreational use, the other Members 
of Parliament who spoke appeared to be much more skeptical.20 The 
great concern for possible invasions of privacy was almost unanimous, 
while a couple of Members of Parliament even suggested increasing 
police powers so that the authorities could not only commandeer drones 
from “rogue” users, but also be equipped with the weapons to destroy 
the drones either upon landing or while they were still in the air.21 In the 
end, while rationality prevailed and the more extreme suggestions raised 
during the debates were not adopted, the debates also did nothing to 
alter the original contents of the Bill, and the Air Navigation Act22 (and 
its subsidiary legislation in the form of the Air Navigation Order)23 and 
Public Order Act24 were amended accordingly.25 
4 This article has two primary aims. First, it seeks to identify 
some of the critical gaps in the current regulatory framework for 
recreational drone users – gaps which should have been identified, 
extensively discussed with the benefit of input from proper experts, and 
pre-empted even before the new law was passed. The identification of 
the gaps in the framework is done in the light of how drone technology, 
particularly with respect to aerial imaging, has evolved greatly and is 
likely to evolve even more, and also by surveying the wide variety of 
                                                          
17 See for instance Sally Newall, “How Drones are Transforming TV Production” 
Independent (27 February 2016). 
18 See Ronald Wong, “Legal Regulation of Drones or Unmanned Aerial Vehicles in 
Singapore” Singapore Law Gazette (September 2015). 
19 Act 16 of 2015. 
20 Singapore Parliamentary Debates, Official Report (11 May 2015) vol 93. 
21 Singapore Parliamentary Debates, Official Report (11 May 2015) vol 93. 
22 Cap 6, 2014 Rev Ed. 
23 Cap 6, O 2, 1990 Rev Ed. 
24 Cap 257A, 2012 Rev Ed. 
25 The Unmanned Aircraft (Public Safety and Security) Act 2015 (Act 16 of 2015) 
itself only contains references to the amended provisions in these two statutes and 
does not create any new law. 
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approaches taken by other jurisdictions in regulating the use of drones. 
Secondly, given the Government’s promise to continue to closely 
monitor development in this area of the law,26 this article advocates for a 
more proportionate and rational response from the Government and 
other stakeholders should future opportunities to amend the regulatory 
framework arise, and further highlights some of the emerging issues that 
would eventually warrant close regulatory attention. 
5 To this end, this article is divided into the following main parts: 
Part I,27 as we have just seen, briefly sets out the context and the aims of 
this article; Part II28 attempts to navigate the current web of laws and 
subsidiary legislation in Singapore to provide as complete a picture as 
possible of the state of regulation for drones (whether used for aerial 
imaging or otherwise); Part III29 then highlights some of the key 
problems that have either eluded meaningful legislative responses or are 
likely to emerge as important issues in the near future, and proposes 
some possible solutions; and Part IV30 is where the recapitulation and 
concluding thoughts reside. Where appropriate, the practices and 
regulations of other jurisdictions will be highlighted and considered 
along the way. 
II. Current regulatory framework in Singapore 
6 What exactly, then, is the current regulatory framework for the 
use of drones in Singapore? It is not that easy to discern immediately, as 
the regulations are scattered throughout various sources of law rather 
than consolidated in a single piece of legislation. Previously, there was 
no direct regulatory framework for the use of modern consumer drones; 
instead, there was a piece of subsidiary legislation (the aforementioned 
Air Navigation Order), introduced several decades before, that regulated 
the use of model aircraft and other similar aerial objects.31 However, 
because model aircraft are fundamentally different from drones in terms 
of characteristics and functions, a series of guidelines was issued by the 
                                                          
26 Singapore Parliamentary Debates, Official Report (11 May 2015) vol 93. The 
Minister for Transport had admitted that the Bill was being expedited through 
Parliament as the Southeast-Asian Games and National Day Parade were round 
the corner. 
27 See paras 1–5 above. 
28 See paras 6–10 below. 
29 See paras 11–36 below. 
30 See paras 37–39 below. 
31 See generally Chen Siyuan, “The Regulation of the Recreational Use of ‘Drones’ for 
Aerial Photography and Videography: Comparing Singapore’s Unmanned Aircraft 
Act with Other Legislation” (2015) 33 Sing L Rev 55. 
 The Regulatory Framework for Aerial Imaging  
(2017) 29 SAcLJ by Recreational Users of “Drones” in Singapore 131 
 
Civil Aviation Authority of Singapore (“CAAS”) to fill in the gap while 
the Government deliberated on the appropriate legislative response.32 
7 That response materialised in 2015. Following the enactment of 
the Unmanned Aerial (Public Safety and Security) Act, amendments 
were made to the Air Navigation Act, Air Navigation Order and Public 
Order Act. Reading all four pieces of legislation together, unmanned 
aircraft – which we can safely assume to refer primarily to drones – that 
are being flown within Singapore, whether for aerial imaging or 
otherwise, are not permitted to do the following: 
(a) Fly at an altitude above 200ft above mean sea level 
unless a permit from CAAS (from which all drone permits and 
certifications are obtained) has been obtained; if this is 
contravened, the punishment upon conviction is a fine not 
exceeding $10,000 (not exceeding $20,000 for subsequent 
convictions).33 However, it is unclear if this prohibition still 
applies if the drone is flown over portions of the sea that go 
beyond Singapore’s territorial waters (but took off from within 
the territory of Singapore). 
(b) Fly within 5km of an airport or airbase unless a permit 
has been obtained;34 if this is contravened, the punishment upon 
conviction is a fine not exceeding $10,000 (not exceeding 
$20,000 for subsequent convictions).35 To be clear, the actual 
term used in the legislation is “aerodrome”, which is defined as 
“a defined area on land (including any building, installation and 
equipment) used or intended to be used, either wholly or in 
part, for the arrival, departure and surface movement of 
aircraft”. This conceivably includes landing pads for helicopters 
as well, since “aircraft” is broadly defined as “any machine that 
can derive support in the atmosphere from the reactions of the 
air other than the reactions of the air against the earth’s surface”. 
However, CAAS itself appears to equate aerodrome only with 
airports and airbases.36 
(c) Fly within danger, prohibited or restricted areas;37 if this 
is contravened, the punishment upon conviction for flying 
                                                          
32 See generally Chen Siyuan, “The Regulation of the Recreational Use of ‘Drones’ for 
Aerial Photography and Videography: Comparing Singapore’s Unmanned Aircraft 
Act with Other Legislation” (2015) 33 Sing L Rev 55. 
33 See Air Navigation Order (Cap 6, O 2, 1990 Rev Ed) paras 72D and 80(4). 
34 See Annex 1 below. 
35 Air Navigation Order (Cap 6, O 2, 1990 Rev Ed) paras 72D and 80(4). 
36 Civil Aviation Authority of Singapore, “Area Limits” <http://www.caas.gov.sg/ 
caas/en/ANS/area-limits.html> (accessed 5 December 2016). 
37 See Annex 2 below. Air Navigation Order (Cap 6, O 2, 1990 Rev Ed) paras 72D and 
72E. A “danger area” is defined as an airspace which is declared by the Chief 
(cont’d on the next page) 
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inside danger or restricted areas is a fine not exceeding $10,000 
(not exceeding $20,000 for subsequent convictions),38 while the 
punishment upon conviction for flying inside prohibited areas is 
a fine not exceeding $20,000 (not exceeding $40,000 or 
imprisonment not exceeding 15 months, or both, for 
subsequent convictions).39 It appears that no permit may be 
obtained to fly within danger, prohibited or restricted areas. 
(d) Fly within or over protected areas (and no photographs 
or videos may be taken of those security-sensitive areas during 
such flights) unless a permit has been obtained; if this is 
contravened, the punishment upon conviction is a fine not 
exceeding $20,000 or an imprisonment term not exceeding 
12 months, or both.40 However, the defence of weather 
conditions (such as wind drifts) or unavoidable cause may be 
raised.41 Notably, this defence is not available to the offences 
listed in the three preceding paragraphs, viz, flying above the 
height limit, flying within 5km of aerodromes, and flying within 
danger, prohibited or restricted areas. 
(e) Fly in a way that is likely to endanger the safety of any 
person, aircraft or property; if this is contravened, the 
                                                                                                                               
Executive of the Civil Aviation Authority of Singapore (“CAAS”) as an area within 
which activities dangerous to the flight of aircraft may exist at specified times; 
a “prohibited area” is defined as an airspace declared by the Chief Executive of 
CAAS as an area within which the flight of aircraft is prohibited; and a “restricted 
area” is defined as an airspace declared by the Chief Executive of CAAS as an area 
within which the flight of aircraft is restricted. On the face of it, none of these 
definitions are helpful at all even if the idea was to preserve flexibility for the 
authorities as they contain no obvious distinctions. 
38 Air Navigation Order (Cap 6, O 2, 1990 Rev Ed) para 80(4). 
39 Air Navigation Order (Cap 6, O 2, 1990 Rev Ed) para 80(5). 
40 Air Navigation Act (Cap 6, 2014 Rev Ed) ss 7 and 7A. A “protected area” is defined 
by what the Minister has by order published in the Gazette (which does not appear 
to have a search function, and does not contain past notices). Further, according to 
the Civil Aviation Authority of Singapore, the drone may not be flown within 
150m of the protected area as the restriction is not limited to overhead flights. The 
same problem, however, rears its head: are there any obvious differences between 
danger, prohibited, restricted and protected areas? While one may consult the 
useful web portal <onemap.sg> for a visual on where these areas are (for which the 
annexes to this article are based on), there are at least four shortcomings. First, 
only danger, prohibited and restricted areas are shown, but not protected areas. 
Secondly, one suspects that the map is overinclusive – for instance, it is difficult to 
see how an entire chunk in the Civic District is cordoned off. Thirdly, even though 
<onemap.sg> (or the Civil Aviation Authority of Singapore’s online maps) is 
sanctioned by the Government, it is unclear if a user can rely on its information as 
a matter of law, or whether a user can point to some other source of information 
when a dispute arises. Finally, there is no guarantee that the information is 
constantly being updated in accordance with the latest developments. 
41 Air Navigation Act (Cap 6, 2014 Rev Ed) ss 7 and 7A. 
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punishment upon conviction is a fine not exceeding $20,000 
(not exceeding $40,000 or imprisonment not exceeding 
15 months, or both, for subsequent convictions).42 
(f) Fly in a way that disrupts or interferes with any activity 
associated with a special event unless a permit has been 
obtained; if this is contravened, the punishment upon 
conviction is a fine not exceeding $20,000 or an imprisonment 
term not exceeding 12 months, or both.43 However, the defence 
of reasonable care may be raised.44 
(g) Carry prohibited items; if this is contravened, the 
punishment upon conviction is a fine not exceeding $100,000 or 
an imprisonment term not exceeding five years, or both.45 
However, the defence of reasonable unknowability may be 
raised.46 It was also clarified in Parliament that if a person uses 
an unmanned aircraft or a drone as a weapon to carry out an 
attack, he can already be prosecuted under various existing 
statutes47 that criminalise such acts, and penalties upon 
conviction range from long-term imprisonment to the death 
penalty.48 Parenthetically, it must be said that this dual-track 
approach is correct and neutralises the highly irrational but 
deep-seated fear that drones would be the weapon of choice for 
terrorists. It recognises, implicitly at least, three fundamental 
truths: consumer drones, because of their limited payload and 
flight times, are extremely poor choices for mounting weapons; 
high-end drones, which do not have those limitations, are 
exceedingly expensive; and quite apart from how the average 
user has no terroristic intent, no drone legislation is going to 
                                                          
42 Air Navigation Order (Cap 6, O 2, 1990 Rev Ed) paras 72E and 80(5). 
43 Public Order Act (Cap 257A, 2012 Rev Ed) s 32. Special events are those which the 
Minister has by order published in the Gazette, and include events such as the 
National Day Parade (and its rehearsals) and the Formula 1 race. Often, however, 
the no-fly-zones created for these events are unduly large and last for unduly long 
durations. 
44 Public Order Act (Cap 257A, 2012 Rev Ed) s 32. 
45 Air Navigation Act (Cap 6, 2014 Rev Ed) s 7B. A “prohibited item” is defined as 
anything the possession of which would constitute any offence under the Arms and 
Explosives Act (Cap 13, 2003 Rev Ed), Corrosive and Explosive Substances and 
Offensive Weapons Act (Cap 65, 2013 Rev Ed) and Dangerous Fireworks Act 
(Cap 72, 2014 Rev Ed), as well as any various items under the Biological Agents 
and Toxins Act (Cap 24A, 2006 Rev Ed) and Radiation Protection Act 
(Cap 262, 2008 Rev Ed), and other hazardous materials that the Minister has by 
order published in the Gazette. 
46 Air Navigation Act (Cap 6, 2014 Rev Ed) s 7B. 
47 For instance, if a person commits a terrorist bombing (as defined by s 3 of the 
Terrorism (Suppression of Bombings) Act (Cap 324A, 2008 Rev Ed), he will face 
either life imprisonment or the death penalty upon conviction. 
48 Singapore Parliamentary Debates, Official Report (11 May 2015) vol 93. 
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deter a terrorist from building his own drone for terrorism 
purposes. 
(h) Discharge or drop anything unless a permit has been 
obtained; if this is contravened, the punishment upon 
conviction is a fine not exceeding $20,000.49 However, the 
defence of reasonable care and mitigation may be raised.50 
(i) Weigh more than 7kg unless a permit has been 
obtained; if this is contravened, the punishment upon 
conviction is a fine not exceeding $20,000 (not exceeding 
$40,000 or imprisonment not exceeding 15 months, or both, for 
subsequent convictions).51 
(j) Be used for commercial activities unless a permit has 
been obtained; if this is contravened, the punishment upon 
conviction is a fine not exceeding $10,000 (not exceeding 
$20,000 for subsequent convictions).52 
8 What is noteworthy at this juncture is that no specific law was 
introduced to addressed the privacy concerns raised during the 
parliamentary debates. Given that the status of a discrete tort of privacy 
in Singapore is ambiguous at best,53 there is perhaps, as suggested in 
Parliament, only general recourse to the Protection from Harassment 
Act54 if a person’s personal life can even be said to be somehow subject 
to harassment by aerial imaging by a drone.55 Indeed, most of the 
regulations listed above do not deal specifically with the issue of aerial 
                                                          
49 Air Navigation Act (Cap 6, 2014 Rev Ed) s 7C. 
50 Air Navigation Act (Cap 6, 2014 Rev Ed) s 7C. However, it is no defence to claim 
that no one was injured or killed, no property was destroyed or damaged, or that 
no hazard was caused to another aircraft, another person or property. 
51 Air Navigation Order (Cap 6, O 2, 1990 Rev Ed) paras 72F, 72L and 80(5). 
52 Air Navigation Order (Cap 6, O 2, 1990 Rev Ed) paras 72D and 80(4). 
53 See AXA Insurance Singapore Pte Ltd v Chandran s/o Natesan [2013] 4 SLR 545 
at [5]–[10]. See also Lim Meng Suang v Attorney-General [2015] 1 SLR 26  
at [44]–[49] and ANB v ANC [2015] 5 SLR 522 at [23]. 
54 Cap 256A, 2014 Rev Ed. 
55 See also Singapore Parliamentary Debates, Official Report (11 May 2015) vol 93: 
Privacy-related incidents where a person uses an unmanned aircraft to pry 
into another person’s property and privacy will be investigated on a case-by-
case basis. As a general principle, enforcement action will be taken against 
users whose activities constitute an offence under existing laws such as the 
Penal Code and the Protection from Harassment Act 2014. The inter-agency 
Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) Committee … is also looking into a 
comprehensive framework on the use of unmanned aircraft in Singapore and 
will look specifically and more deeply into the issue of privacy, to see if our 
current laws are adequate and if any regulatory enhancements are needed. 
 However, given that the Minister for Transport retired from politics shortly after 
this Bill was introduced, it is unclear if the committee in question has continued 
with its task. 
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imaging, and are focused instead on general drone misuse that may lead 
to danger or a compromise of security. The issue of privacy is something 
that will be considered again in greater detail at subsequent points of 
this article. For now, it bears mention that the following prohibitions 
(which are presumably subject to the pilots’ obtainment of the relevant 
permits) have also been declared by CAAS,56 but the precise legal bases 
for some of these prohibitions, as well as their legal status, remain 
unclear: 
(a) Flying over crowds or busy roads. 
(b) Flying in a way that interferes with emergency 
responders such as policemen, firemen and ambulances. 
(c) Flying in bad weather or bad visibility conditions. 
(d) Using prohibited frequencies or using batteries that 
exceed prescribed limits. 
(e) Flying without line-of-sight (which means sole reliance 
on first-person-view technology is prohibited; what is less clear 
is whether a spotter may be used instead). 
(f) Flying at night (which is presumably interpreted 
broadly to include low-light conditions).57 
9 These ambiguities aside, law enforcement officers have also 
been given the following powers as a result of the changes to the law in 
2015; these changes are important to note because they spell out what 
may happen to the drone user and his drone if a violation of the law is 
imminent or being committed: 
(a) If an authorised person has reason to believe that an 
unmanned aircraft is being operated in a way that contravenes 
the Air Navigation Act or any aviation safety subsidiary 
legislation or that poses a serious and an imminent risk to 
public safety, he may direct the pilot to end the flight or fly it in 
a specified manner, with assistance and by force as is necessary 
assume control of the flight to end it or land the aircraft in the 
fastest and safest practicable way, or seize the aircraft if he has 
reason to believe it contains material evidence or that it will be 
                                                          
56 See Civil Aviation Authority of Singapore, “Fly it Safe” <http://www.caas.gov.sg/ 
caasWeb2010/export/sites/caas/en/ANS/unmanned-aircraft.html> (accessed 
5 December 2016). 
57 This is one ambiguity that ought to be explored. Briefly, even assuming this is an 
enforceable rule, one has three main options when deciding what qualifies as night 
flying: a cut-off based on the daily sunset and/or sunrise time; a fixed window 
every day, throughout the year; and leaving it to pilot judgment. Most jurisdictions 
have left the issue undefined, but this is mainly because they experience multiple 
seasons and dramatic light changes every year. 
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concealed, lost, destroyed or used in the continuation of an 
offence.58 
(b) If an authorised person has reason to believe that an 
unmanned aircraft is being operated in a way that may interfere 
with a special event (as defined in the Public Order Act) or that 
poses a serious and an imminent risk to the security or safety of 
persons attending the event, he may direct the pilot to end the 
flight or fly it in a specified manner, with assistance and by force 
as is necessary assume control of the flight to end it or land the 
aircraft in the fastest and safest practicable way, or seize the 
aircraft if he has reason to believe it contains material evidence 
or that it will be concealed, lost, destroyed or used in the 
continuation of an offence.59 
(c) An authorised person may require a person whom he 
has reasonable grounds to suspect is just about to contravene 
Pt XA of the Air Navigation Order to furnish his name, address, 
or other proof of identity on demand; refusal to comply without 
reasonable excuse or the reckless furnishing of false information 
is an offence punishable with a fine not exceeding $20,000 (not 
exceeding $40,000 or imprisonment not exceeding 15 months, 
or both, for subsequent convictions).60 
10 Having set out the key aspects of the current regulatory 
framework for recreational drone users in Singapore, we turn to the 
question of whether there are any problems or gaps that need to be 
addressed. In doing so, some of the main features of current drone 
technology, as well as the approaches adopted by other jurisdictions 
where appropriate, will be considered. 
                                                          
58 Air Navigation Act (Cap 6, 2014 Rev Ed) s 29G. An “authorised person” is a police 
officer, or an auxiliary police officer, of or above the rank of sergeant and 
authorised by the Commissioner of Police to exercise powers under the provision 
or a safety inspector or individual with the suitable qualifications and experience 
authorised by the Civil Aviation Authority of Singapore to exercise powers under 
the provision. 
59 Public Order Act (Cap 257A, 2012 Rev Ed) s 32A. An “authorised person” is a 
police officer, or an auxiliary police officer, of or above the rank of sergeant and 
authorised by the Commissioner of Police to exercise powers under the provision. 
60 Air Navigation Order (Cap 6, O 2, 1990 Rev Ed) paras 72K and 80(5). 
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III. Current and potential problems with regulatory framework 
and some possible solutions 
A. Absence of other limits: Distance, speed and proximity 
11 Based on existing regulations, we know without doubt that by 
default, drones may not be flown 200ft above mean sea level and/or 
within 5km of any aerodrome. But height and proximity-to-airport 
limits, although a legacy of prior legislation that governed other types of 
unmanned aerial vehicles, are fairly conventional in legislation around 
the world, and any divergence between the laws in different countries is 
to be found in the extent of the limits (for which Singapore is on the 
restrictive end of the spectrum), rather than the existence of the limits.61 
What are actually less conventional, though one would have thought to 
be logical to provide for, are distance, speed and proximity limits – and 
these are not provided for at all in the local regulatory framework. These 
limits, and the purpose in providing them, will be discussed in turn. 
12 Beginning with distance limits, one may argue that they are 
already implicit in the requirement of line-of-sight when flying. One big 
problem with this, as alluded to earlier, is that the requirement of line-
of-sight, as it is with the prohibitions on night flights and flights over 
crowds, finds no direct or clear expression in the regulations. It appears 
only to be a guideline or good practice recommended by CAAS, and if 
so, it has no binding force and cannot be enforced.62 At any rate, the 
point of having in place a distance limit goes beyond the formalistic 
concern of certainty in the law. It is also about having regulations that 
cohere and are consistent with one another. If this aspect of the 
regulations is left undefined and open-ended, it is an unintended 
anomaly that potentially undermines what is otherwise a fairly 
restrictive framework. 
13 To illustrate, assuming there is not much variance between how 
far different human eyes can see, whether a drone is within line-of-sight 
is ultimately going to depend on the characteristics of the drone in 
question, such as its size, colour, light signals and audibility, and the 
                                                          
61 Many countries (see for instance France, New Zealand and the UK) impose a 
height limit of 400 to 500ft (with reference to the take-off spot, rather than using 
mean sea level) for recreational users, while the airport-proximity distance 
typically ranges from 4km (for instance New Zealand) to 10km (for instance South 
Africa). 
62 In contrast, interference with emergency providers is clearly provided for in other 
sources of law, such as s 44 of the Fire Safety Act (Cap 109A, 2000 Rev Ed). This is 
not to say the Civil Aviation Authority of Singapore is not authorised to create 
regulations, but the line-of-sight requirement is not currently couched as a 
mandatory rule. 
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presence of other drones when in flight. A DJI Phantom 4 and DJI 
Inspire 1 Pro63 – two of the most popular quadcopters on the ever-
burgeoning market today, and both well within the 7kg, recreational 
class – are vastly different in the said characteristics, and therefore 
present very different line-of-sight results: on a bright day and without 
tall obstructions (and here weather conditions and topography present 
more variables yet), one estimates that a Phantom 4 is probably going to 
be within line-of-sight up to 1,000ft away (notably, the just-released DJI 
Mavic, which will supersede the Phantom line, is even smaller).64 The 
much larger and more conspicuous Inspire 1 Pro65 will probably remain 
visible up to 2,000 or even 3,000ft away – and signal loss is not an issue 
yet at this distance, given that the Inspire 1 Pro can be controlled up to 
5km away if there is not too much wireless interference.66 These 
numbers stand in stark contrast to the altitude limit of a measly 200ft 
and do not produce an internally consistent picture if safety is a 
paramount concern: how is it that 200ft is too high, but 3,000ft or more 
is not too far away in the eyes of the law? 
14 Indeed, it would not be fanciful to suggest at all that a drone 
being flown 3,000ft away from the pilot (but within the 200ft altitude 
limit) is more dangerous than a drone being flown more than, say, twice 
the 200ft limit above the pilot but comfortably within line-of-sight. Yet if 
the authorities were to act (as they are authorised to do, as we have seen 
above, under the Air Navigation Act and Public Order Act) because they 
believe a pilot is posing a serious and imminent risk to public safety, 
they could actually end up exacerbating the danger in the scenario 
where the drone is far away, but the blame may be pinned on the pilot. 
Trying to commandeer the drone may result in a loss of line-of-sight, 
and trying to land the drone from afar without line-of-sight is self-
explanatorily hazardous. And in the first place, how does one, for the 
purposes of arrest or prosecution, refute the pilot’s claim that the drone 
was indeed within his line-of-sight? If there is an express distance limit 
prescribed, the drone app and flight logs would be able to show, among 
other various flight parameters, how far the drone was away from the 
pilot and the pilot can make the necessary adjustments accordingly.67 
                                                          
63 The Inspire 2 and Phantom 4 Pro were released shortly after this article was first 
submitted, and while they boast impressive upgrades in specifications for hardware 
and software, they do not affect the core arguments made in this article. 
64 DJI, “Mavic Specs” <http://www.dji.com/mavic/info> (accessed 5 December 2016). 
65 The Inspire 1 Pro weighs around 3.5kg, or almost three times the weight of the 
Phantom 4; its diagonal size is 559mm as compared to the Phantom 4’s 350mm: 
DJI, “Inspire 1 Pro/Raw Specs” <http://www.dji.com/inspire-1-pro-and-raw/info# 
specs> (accessed 5 December 2016). 
66 DJI, “Inspire 1 Pro/Raw Specs” <http://www.dji.com/inspire-1-pro-and-raw/info# 
specs> (accessed 5 December 2016). 
67 See for instance DJI, “DJI Go” <http://www.dji.com/goapp> (accessed 5 December 
2016). Further, under s 116A(1) of the Evidence Act (Cap 97, 1997 Rev Ed): 
(cont’d on the next page) 
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Without an express limit but only a requirement for line-of-sight, it 
would be much more difficult, both at the point of trying to prevent an 
accident and when the matter is investigated or prosecuted, to refute the 
pilot’s claim that the drone was indeed in his line of sight.68 It is not 
enough to dismiss a distance limit rule simply on the basis that some 
drones would be less or more visible than others. 
15 A related issue to consider is whether having a spotter satisfies 
the line-of-sight requirement. Despite the inherent solitary nature of the 
activity, not all drone users fly alone – for more complex flights, it is 
common for the pilot to have a spotter located somewhere along the 
flight path, or to have a separate pilot controlling only the camera. This 
is usually done when the pilot is going to rely solely on first-person-view 
for the purposes of piloting the drone, and the spotter or co-pilot is put 
in place to locate the drone in case the video stream gets cut. In the US, 
it appears that drone users are allowed to fly their drones beyond their 
line-of-sight, provided that there is a spotter elsewhere to maintain line-
of-sight.69 So long as the spotter is able to communicate with the pilot 
remotely, the line-of-sight is artificially increased this way. Presumably, 
more than one spotter may be used for this purpose. This is something 
the Singapore authorities do not appear to have considered, quite apart 
from whether line-of-sight is even a strict requirement. The other 
obvious possibility in this area of regulation is to insist on an express 
distance limit, as is done in countries such as Germany (300m),70 South 
Africa (500m)71 and the UK (500m).72 
                                                                                                                               
[W]here a device or process is one that, or is of a kind that, if properly used, 
ordinarily produces or accurately communicates an electronic record, the 
court shall presume that in producing or communicating that electronic 
record on the occasion in question, the device or process produced or 
accurately communicated the electronic record. 
 However, as mentioned, the app may measure altitude based on the take-off spot 
rather than, say, mean sea level. In this specific respect, unless this is made clear in 
the operation manual for the app, can one assume that the app’s data is accurate 
for the purposes of complying with the regulations? 
68 Using s 108 of the Evidence Act (Cap 97, 1997 Rev Ed) – which states that a party 
bears the burden of proving facts particularly within his knowledge – would not be 
very helpful either. How is he supposed to prove that the drone was within his line-
of-sight other than just insist that it was? 
69 Federal Aviation Administration, “Summary of Small Unmanned Aircraft Rule 
(Part 107)” <http://www.faa.gov/uas/media/Part_107_Summary.pdf> (accessed 
5 December 2016). 
70 Wilde Beuger Solmecke Rechtsanwälte, “Civilian Drones and the Legal Issues 
Surrounding Their Use” <https://www.wbs-law.de/internetrecht/civilian-drones-
legal-issues-surrounding-use-50459/> (accessed 5 December 2016). 
71 Library of Congress, “Regulation of Drones: South Africa” <https://www.loc.gov/ 
law/help/regulation-of-drones/south-africa.php> (accessed 5 December 2016). 
72 Sophie Curtis, “Drone Laws in the UK – What are the Rules?” The Telegraph 
(16 April 2016). 
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16 What about speed limits? This omission appears to be another 
puzzling gap in the regulatory framework. However, this gap is probably 
explainable again by the historical fact that until drones (in the form as 
we know them today) became mainstream in the last couple of years, the 
air navigation legislation largely only contemplated the use of radio-
controlled model aircraft (“RCA”) as far as unmanned aircraft were 
concerned – the sort that were used primarily for racing or acrobatics 
rather than aerial imaging.73 Such aircraft were also relatively large and 
were usually powered by fuel (at least in the past) rather than lithium 
polymer batteries. Many models could (and still can) easily reach top 
speeds in excess of a few hundred kilometres per hour, and the 
assumption could have been that so long as the users of such aircraft 
exercised reasonable care in the general sense, speed limits need not and 
should not be imposed since the whole point of racing and aerial 
acrobatics is to fly at high speeds. The other probable assumption is that 
because there was only a small and relatively defined community of 
RCA users, their activity was seen as a niche hobby and the authorities 
were quite happy to leave them to regulate their own space, especially 
since speeding and acrobatics do not by their nature demand high 
altitudes, unlike aerial imaging. Vertical, and not lateral airspace, was 
the primary concern of the authorities. Further, whereas drone imaging 
enthusiasts seek to unlock the latest never-seen-before vista and will not 
be content in just flying in fixed locations, those into racing and 
acrobatics were able to conduct their activity in fixed and secluded 
areas; it was in their interests to find a flying location that was open and 
safe, and the aesthetic qualities of the surrounding landscape were 
probably completely irrelevant to them. The upshot of all of this, 
however, is that drones are now inheriting another aspect of the 
regulatory legacy of a very different type of aerial vehicle that has always 
been used for a very different type of activity. Appreciating this then 
forecloses the potential objection that drones used for aerial imaging are 
only capable of relatively modest speeds – for instance, the Inspire 1 Pro 
has a maximum speed of 18m/s or 64.8km/h,74 and there are many other 
faster models – because while drones are not designed to reach very 
high speeds, their less predictable flight paths, dependent on the images 
and footage sought by the pilot, may warrant speed caps. In other words, 
the law should be more nuanced and not treat all unmanned aerial 
vehicles as a monolithic, undistinguishable entity that only has a 
                                                          
73 Before the 2015 amendments, the Air Navigation Order (Cap 6, O 2, 1990 Rev Ed) 
only contemplated the use of kits and parasails (para 64), captive balloons 
(para 64A), free flight aerial objects (para 64B) and model aircraft and unmanned 
airships (para 64C). Paragraph 64C has since been deleted and replaced with the 
omnibus Pt XA. 
74 DJI, “Inspire 1 Pro/Raw Specs” <http://www.dji.com/inspire-1-pro-and-raw/info# 
specs> (accessed 5 December 2016). 
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singular use with indistinguishable attendant risks. There is little 
justification for drones used in aerial imaging to travel at racing speeds. 
17 Having said that, how does one rationalise the fact that speed 
limits for drones have also not been imposed in many other jurisdictions 
as well, including jurisdictions that have studied the matter very closely 
before modifying their drone laws? For instance, countries such as 
Australia, Canada, Germany, Hong Kong, South Africa, the UK and the 
US have, like Singapore, not seen fit to include speed limits in their 
latest drone regulations.75 In this connection, one may also point to the 
aforementioned general obligation to fly safely, which is mandated by 
the Air Navigation Order,76 as a possible workaround: a drone pilot who 
flies safely is not a drone pilot who will fly at too high a speed. Indeed, 
one may even go one step further and argue that quite apart from the 
line-of-sight requirement, this general obligation also encompasses the 
duty not to fly the drone at too far a distance, thus obviating the need to 
create a discrete cap for drone-to-pilot distance. But there are no less 
than four counterpoints to subsuming all types of express limits under a 
general duty to fly safely, notwithstanding the ostensible flexibility 
afforded to both pilots and regulators through a broad rule. 
18 First, what exactly would be considered speed so excessive that 
it crosses the threshold of safety? While one appreciates the fact that 
different classes of drones present different degrees of danger when 
flying at high speeds, the better way forward may be to prescribe 
different speed limits based on factors such as the weight and class of 
drone, the presence of safety features in the drone, pilot expertise and 
the activity in question. Again, as is the case with drone-to-pilot 
distance, the speed at which the drone is travelling is easily determined 
by drone apps that instantly reflect flight parameters, and for forensic 
purposes they are captured in the flight logs as well. Secondly, the fact 
that a distance limit may, together with a speed limit, be conceptually 
subsumed under a general duty to fly safely does nothing to surmount 
the practical difficulties stated above with respect to both the user’s 
regulation of his conduct and the enforcement of the rule. Thirdly, many 
shades of conduct can be classified as a likely endangerment to the safety 
of persons or property, but with very different consequences. A simple 
illustration suffices to make this point. 
19 In one scenario, suppose a person pilots his drone from 3,000ft 
away (but within line-of-sight) and at the maximum speed the drone is 
capable of (say, 65km/h), and due to the battery running out during the 
                                                          
75 Chen Siyuan, “Comparative Analysis of “Anti-Drone” Legislation”, Conference 
Presentation at HKU-NUS-SMU Symposium (2016). 
76 Air Navigation Order (Cap 6, O 2, 1990 Rev Ed) paras 72E and 80(5). 
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return route the drone crash-lands into a public gathering of people, 
severely injuring a number of them. In another scenario, a person pilots 
his drone at a low speed and comfortably within line-of-sight but due to 
a parallax error he crashes it into a building, damaging a few glass 
windows. As stated earlier, the punishment for dangerous flying is a 
$20,000 fine,77 but while the former scenario clearly entailed a more 
egregious violation and greater threat to persons and property than the 
latter scenario, they would both fall under the same offence, and given 
the relative nascence of the activity, the pressure on the authorities to 
prosecute and convict either offender is equally high. Putting aside the 
difficulty of proving that the pilot was acting more recklessly in one 
scenario over the other, it seems entirely open for the pilot to argue that 
he was not doing anything unsafe as he was not flying the drone at that 
great a speed and, further, his drone was still within line-of-sight. This 
leads us to the final counterpoint to subsuming distance and speed 
limits under a general duty to fly safely, and the third gap regarding 
limits in our regulatory framework: without a clear and express rule for 
proximity to persons and buildings – CAAS’s recommendation for 
drones not to be flown near crowds appears again only to be a guideline 
and without a discernible legal basis – drone pilots will have yet another 
layer of difficulty trying to conform their conduct to an overly open-
textured duty. Other jurisdictions have thus taken a different approach 
on this matter. 
20 Specifically, instead of having only a general duty not to cause 
damage to persons or property, many jurisdictions have chosen to set 
express limits as to the distance that must be kept between the drone 
and persons and property.78 For instance, in the UK, drones cannot be 
flown within 50m of people, vehicles, buildings or structures (though 
this only appears to apply to drones fitted with cameras – which means 
the concern goes beyond safety but includes privacy as well); further, 
drones cannot be flown over congested areas or large gatherings such as 
concerts and sports events.79 In comparison, in Hong Kong, drones also 
cannot be flown over or within 50m of any person, vessel, vehicle or 
structure not under the control of the pilot; however, for take-off and 
landing, the limit is relaxed to 30m (but this limit does not apply to the 
pilot – the law sensibly recognises that the pilot needs to be close to the 
                                                          
77 Air Navigation Order (Cap 6, O 2, 1990 Rev Ed) paras 72E and 80(5). 
78 In other words, it is acceptable to have a general duty to fly safely (as is found in 
the legislation of jurisdictions such as Japan), but it is worth considering if such a 
duty should be supplemented with more precise rules, either across the board or 
on a drone-by-class basis. 
79 Civil Aviation Authority, “The Dronecode” <https://www.caa.co.uk/Consumers/ 
Model-aircraft-and-drones/The-Dronecode/> (accessed 5 December 2016). 
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drone when it takes off and lands).80 Most other jurisdictions adopt 
positions between these two ends of the spectrum, though some set 
more extreme limits. For instance, in Canada, drones cannot be flown 
closer than 150m from people, animals, buildings, structures or vehicles, 
and also cannot be flown in populated areas or near large groups of 
people (including sporting events, concerts and the like).81 For an 
example of a more permissive approach, in Thailand, no specific 
proximity limit is prescribed save that drones may not be flown over 
crowded areas (so this is similar to Singapore, except that the flight-
over-crowds probation only appears to be a guideline and not captured 
in the legislation here).82 
21 Then there are jurisdictions that apply proximity limits in 
conjunction with the previously discussed distance limits. In France, 
drones cannot be flown more than 200m away from the pilot – but a 
height limit of 500ft applies – and they also cannot be flown over 
densely populated towns or cities.83 This limit exists on a sliding scale 
with respect to one particular dimension, however. The 200m limit 
applies to recreational fliers of drones that weigh less than 2kg. For 
larger and heavier drones, the distance limit is increased up to a 
kilometre, but permits and certifications may need to be obtained as 
greater dispensations are sought.84 For comparison, in Germany, the 
aforementioned flat distance limit of 300m is imposed, together with the 
prohibition of flying near crowds or gazetted areas.85 So Singapore’s 
drone regulations not only do not contain distance limits and speed 
limits, they also say nothing specific about proximity to persons, crowds 
or property – save of course that places that have been designated as 
danger, prohibited, protected or restricted areas by the Government may 
                                                          
80 Civil Aviation Department, “Operations of Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS)” 
<http://www.cad.gov.hk/english/Unmanned_Aircraft_Systems.html> (accessed 
5 December 2016). 
81 Transport Canada, “Flying Your Drone Safely and Legally” <https://www.tc.gc.ca/ 
eng/civilaviation/opssvs/flying-drone-safely-legally.html> (accessed 5 December 
2016). 
82 UAV Systems International, “Thailand Drone Laws” <https://uavsystems 
international.com/drone-laws-by-country/thailand-drone-laws/> (accessed 
5 December 2016). 
83 4 Revolution, “Drones: New Regulations in France for 2016” <http://www. 
4erevolution.com/en/drones-une-nouvelle-reglementation-francaise-en-2016/> 
(accessed 5 December 2016). 
84 4 Revolution, “Drones: New Regulations in France for 2016” <http://www. 
4erevolution.com/en/drones-une-nouvelle-reglementation-francaise-en-2016/> 
(accessed 5 December 2016). 
85 Wilde Beuger Solmecke Rechtsanwälte, “Civilian Drones and the Legal Issues 
Surrounding Their Use” <https://www.wbs-law.de/internetrecht/civilian-drones-
legal-issues-surrounding-use-50459/> (accessed 5 December 2016). 
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not be flown over.86 Perhaps the draftsmen thought that since it would 
be quite difficult to fly drones in crowded Singapore without being in 
fairly close proximity to persons or property, it would be fairer to drone 
users if the duty was just one of general care rather than one comprising 
specific limits. We do not know – but it is precisely because we do not 
know that it is equally open to make the inference that the Legislature 
assumed that drone users in Singapore would recognise the natural 
constraints presented and would simply avoid flying near persons or 
buildings to begin with. 
22 All things considered, is it better to be as precise with the law as 
possible (but have a sliding scale for, say, different types of drones, skill 
level and activity), or to have a more flexible but inherently open-ended 
test of general duty not to endanger persons or property? After all, this 
would be no different from how the common law approaches the 
development of the law of torts (such as negligence, battery or trespass). 
The obvious difference between this and tort law, however, is that a 
violation of the drone regulations is a potential criminal prosecution 
with fairly drastic sentences upon conviction. No matter what virtues 
one can think of as regards leaving matters to prosecutorial discretion, 
this remains a new area of law and the users deserve to have the law 
presented with maximum clarity.87 The answer also depends, in part, on 
how one views the state of drone technology and its foreseeable 
trajectory. When drones first became mainstream sometime in 2014, 
they were still prone to flyaways, loss of signal between drone and 
controller, loss of image signal, loss of GPS, compass error, battery 
failure, propeller failure, the controlling app crashing, bird attacks and a 
litany of other issues.88 Most drones back then could barely clock a 
handful of flights before crashing beyond feasible repair. The modern 
drone, in contrast, is packed with impressive features that improve the 
overall safety and longevity of the machine, such as the seamless 
integration of GPS (usually together with GLONASS (Global Navigation 
Satellite System)) with flight controls that keeps the drone steady and 
also makes it flight-path programmable, multi-directional VPS (vision 
positioning system) and anti-collision sensors that help prevent the 
drone from colliding into objects while in flight (especially when flying 
indoors), reliable first-person-view stream (which is a great insurance 
when line-of-sight is lost), subject-matter view to complement the first-
person-view, propeller redundancy, computer core redundancy, 
programmable auto-land and auto-return-home contingencies, object-
                                                          
86 Air Navigation Order (Cap 6, O 2, 1990 Rev Ed) paras 72D and 72E; Air 
Navigation Act (Cap 6, 2014 Rev Ed) ss 7 and 7A. 
87 See generally Chen Siyuan, “The Limits on Prosecutorial Discretion in Singapore: 
Past, Present, and Future” (2013) 2(1) International Review of Law 1. 
88 Jack Nicas, “What Happens When Your Drone Escapes” The Wall Street Journal 
(8 December 2014). 
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tracking pre-configuration, real-time feedback of impending machine 
malfunction, to name but a few breakthroughs.89 Optional accessories 
(some of which are already integrated with newer drones) that enhance 
safety to varying degrees include battery redundancy, computer core and 
sensor redundancy, parachute systems, propeller guards, weather-
resistant components and modified landing gear.90 
23 In a nutshell, the modern consumer drone is very easy to 
control and programme, much less likely than before to crash (whether 
through pilot error, failure to perform pre-flight procedures, machine 
malfunction or a bird strike), and even if it is about to get into an 
accident, safety features may kick in to greatly reduce any damage to 
persons or property. With the passage of time, the safety features and 
airworthiness of drones are only going to get much better. The law can 
also facilitate this, in that manufacturers can be mandated to include 
some or all of the aforementioned safety features in their drones – 
whether through hardware design (such as propeller and battery 
redundancies, complementary cameras, parachute systems or even 
speed caps) or software updates (such as creating and updating, in 
regular consultation with the authorities, geo-fenced no-fly-zones via 
the app used to pilot the drones so that users do not need to guess where 
the prohibited, protected and restricted areas are) – before they can be 
sold, and drones that do not meet these safety standards can be banned 
from importation and sale. Such an imposition would not be an undue 
intervention with the freedom of commerce, since it is in the interests of 
both drone makers and drone users to be able to fly drones safely, and 
more importantly such technologies already exist and do not add much 
to costs. Further, the extent of the safety features required should also 
depend on the drone and the activity. Generally, the heavier the drone 
and the more complex the activity, the more safety features should be 
mandated. Allowing manufacturers to work with regulators also obviates 
the intractable difficulties associated with mandating drone insurance 
for recreational users.91 
24 Accordingly, if the legislative focus is going to be solely on 
safety92 – as evinced by the other existing prohibitions relating to danger, 
prohibited, protected and restricted areas as well – it stands to reason in 
                                                          
89 Scott Gilbertson, “Review: Yuneec Typhoon H” Wired (30 May 2016). 
90 Sean Gallagher, “New Drone Parachute Saves Falling Drones – And the People 
Under Them” ARS Technica (5 April 2016). 
91 See generally Daniel North, “Private Drones: Regulations and Insurance” (2015) 
27(2) Loyola Consumer Law Review 334. 
92 That is, safety in terms of reliability of the technology so that persons and property 
would not be damaged when crashes occur. The flipside to reliable drone 
technology is that drones may then become suitable modes of transport or even 
weapons for criminals. 
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the light of these technological developments to eschew an overly 
categorical approach to regulation, whether for the time being or in the 
future. One problem with this, as alluded to earlier, is that a drone 
accident can expose the user to both civil and criminal penalties at the 
same time, so he needs to know exactly what sort of conduct could 
potentially land him in trouble. Another problem is that drones are not 
just seen as being potentially unsafe. As witnessed during the 
parliamentary debates surrounding the Unmanned Aircraft (Public 
Safety and Security) Bill, drones are widely seen as a significant threat to 
privacy rights as well. 
B. Perceived threats to right to privacy and other related rights 
25 But for there to be an alleged breach of privacy, such a right 
must exist in the first place. It was mentioned earlier that a discrete right 
to privacy may not exist in Singapore. On another view, however, some 
manner of a right to privacy does exist in Singapore, but it is manifested 
only in bits and pieces, and in very particular forms within very 
particular contexts. One such instance may be found in the Personal 
Data Protection Act 2012,93 but as s 3 of the legislation itself states,94 the 
statute is focused on how personal data is collected and commercially 
exploited by business organisations, and is not exactly meant to protect 
individuals from having their photographs taken by recreational users of 
drones.95 As it were, photographers can freely take images and videos of 
persons in Singapore without their consent provided that the setting is 
public and no crime is committed in the process,96 so why should drone 
users, often armed with far less capable cameras, be treated differently? 
Similarly, the anti-harassment legislation that was mentioned during the 
parliamentary debates is meant to target anti-social behaviour such as 
workplace harassment, stalking and cyber-bullying, and may not 
necessarily give rise to a discrete right to privacy properly so called.97 In 
                                                          
93 Act 26 of 2012. 
94 Section 3 of the Personal Data Protection Act 2012 (Act 26 of 2012) states: 
The purpose of this Act is to govern the collection, use and disclosure of 
personal data by organisations in a manner that recognises both the right of 
individuals to protect their personal data and the need of organisations to 
collect, use or disclose personal data for purposes that a reasonable person 
would consider appropriate in the circumstances. 
95 See also Personal Data Protection Commission Singapore, “Legislation and 
Guidelines: Overview” <https://www.pdpc.gov.sg/legislation-and-guidelines> 
(accessed 5 December 2016). 
96 See Personal Data Protection Commission Singapore, “Advisory Guidelines on the 
PDPA for Selected Topics: Photography” <https://www.pdpc.gov.sg/docs/default-
source/advisory-guidelines---selected-topics/photography-(chapter-9)-110914.pdf 
?sfvrsn=2> (accessed 5 December 2016). 
97 See Singapore Parliamentary Debates, Official Report (13 March 2014) vol 91 in 
which the Protection from Harassment Bill was being debated. 
 The Regulatory Framework for Aerial Imaging  
(2017) 29 SAcLJ by Recreational Users of “Drones” in Singapore 147 
 
fact, the word “privacy”, or any of its grammatical variants, do not 
appear in either legislation, and this suggests the right not to be 
photographed or videoed, whether by a drone or otherwise, just does 
not exist. 
26 This is not to say that it is technically impossible for a drone 
user to commit a violation of either the data protection statute or anti-
harassment statute. In respect of the former, however, the user of the 
drone must be exploiting the photograph(s) or video(s) of the 
individual(s) in question for commercial gain before any claim for data 
protection can be made,98 and it is not in the interests of a commercial 
drone user to recklessly intrude into the space of random individuals. As 
regards the latter, a drone is simply not a very viable tool to intentionally 
cause harassment, alarm or distress via “threatening, abusive or insulting 
words or behaviour”99 or to intentionally cause someone to believe that 
unlawful violence will be used against the victim via “threatening, 
abusive or insulting words or behaviour”.100 A user who pilots the drone 
in such a way is more likely a source of amusement or irritation than a 
true harasser who can cause mental harm – and in any event would be 
already prohibited from piloting the drone recklessly by virtue of the 
existing regulations.101 However, it should be noted that since it is 
possible to stalk someone through a course of conduct that causes 
“harassment, alarm or distress” and stalking includes loitering in any 
place outside or near a person’s place of residence, it is possible that 
repeatedly flying a drone near the victim’s home may constitute an 
offence.102 
27 In any case, one may look beyond mental harm and equate 
privacy with the right not to be spied upon, but the modern consumer 
drone is highly unsuitable for surveillance. This is because unlike 
military-grade drones, consumer drones are not able to fly at very high 
altitudes, are highly conspicuous with blinking lights, are extremely 
noisy even when more than a hundred metres away, typically have a 
maximum flight time of 15 minutes, and are easily disrupted by wireless 
interferences or wind tunnels in urban areas – if effective spying 
                                                          
98 Personal Data Protection Act 2012 (Act 26 of 2012) Second Schedule. 
99 Protection from Harassment Act (Cap 256A, 2015 Rev Ed) s 3. Section 4 creates a 
similar offence but has a lower mens rea requirement. 
100 Protection from Harassment Act (Cap 256A, 2015 Rev Ed) s 5. Section 6 pertains 
to abuse against public servants or public service workers. 
101 It is accepted, however, that if the user should post and circulate any embarrassing 
images on, say, social media, there could be some cause for concern, but the blame 
cannot be laid squarely at the feet of drones. 
102 Protection from Harassment Act (Cap 256A, 2015 Rev Ed) s 7. The mens rea here 
is not limited to intention but includes a situation where the accused person 
“knows or ought reasonably to know” that his actions will cause harassment, alarm 
or distress. 
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requires stealth and a powerful imager, the modern consumer drone has 
absolutely none of those things.103 Thus, if neither the Personal Data 
Protection Act nor the Protection from Harassment Act gives 
individuals a right not to have their photographs taken by drones and 
there is also, as mentioned earlier, nothing in the common law that 
supports a right to privacy and nothing in the current regulatory 
framework for drones that even comes close to creating privacy rights, it 
cannot be said with great confidence that Singapore drone laws were 
designed with enforceable privacy concerns in mind. 
28 Be that as it may, it was also mentioned in Parliament when the 
Unmanned Aircraft (Public Safety and Security) Bill was debated that 
privacy concerns would be something the Government would look at 
more closely in due course. When that time comes, it is essential that 
any modifications to the regulatory framework are based on a proper 
understanding of how drones work. Moreover, we do not want a 
situation where people feel a need to take matters into their own hands 
by acquiring, for instance, drone jammer technology just to protect their 
own privacy – such tools are only going to cause much more harm than 
good.104 Proceeding, therefore, on the assumption that a right to privacy 
exists or will eventually exist in Singapore, how should that be taken into 
account as far as drone regulations are concerned? To be clear, there was 
perhaps once a time not too long ago, when it could not seriously be 
contended that recreational drones could be used to capture usable 
photographs or videos of individuals. Such a conclusion was predicated 
on the fact that for a long time, consumer drones were, without 
exception, fitted only with prime wide-angle lenses (usually 20mm or 
less, based on the 35mm format) that could not be detached, and 
mounted in front of sensors that were smaller than those found in 
mobile phones (therefore no larger than 1/3.2” or at most 1/2.3”) – in 
other words, any sort of aerial imaging to be done by drones was 
confined to panoramic photography in the daytime, and getting close-
up images of any quality were a total impossibility, unless the drone was 
flying in extremely close proximity to the individual and there were also 
no obstacles in the way.105 The only alternative to this was to use a drone 
with a very high payload, but that would bring it outside the 7kg class 
and beyond the default regulatory framework for drones – meaning a 
whole other suite of requirements such as permits and certifications 
                                                          
103 See generally Chen Siyuan, “The Regulation of the Recreational Use of ‘Drones’ for 
Aerial Photography and Videography: Comparing Singapore’s Unmanned Aircraft 
Act with Other Legislation” (2015) 33 Sing L Rev 55. 
104 Sean Gallagher, “Dronebuster Will Let You Point and Shoot Command Hacks 
at Pesky Drones” ARS Technica (20 May 2016). 
105 See generally Chen Siyuan, “The Regulation of the Recreational Use of ‘Drones’ for 
Aerial Photography and Videography: Comparing Singapore’s Unmanned Aircraft 
Act with Other Legislation” (2015) 33 Sing L Rev 55. 
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would need to be complied with. That situation changed considerably 
with the introduction of the Inspire 1 Pro in 2015. 
29 Though only a prosumer-level drone, the Inspire 1 Pro 
represented not just a light refresh of the original Inspire 1, but came 
with a far more complex multi-axis gimbal for smooth footage, a much 
larger sensor (micro four-thirds) spread over an improved 
16 megapixels and most importantly a mount that supported a variety of 
detachable lenses, including optical zoom lenses.106 To put matters into 
greater perspective, the drone’s sensor received a twelvefold upgrade in 
size over its predecessor, and with the use of longer interchangeable 
lenses such as the Olympus M.Zuiko 45mm f1.8 (giving a focal length of 
90mm, based on the 35mm format), the Inspire 1 line suddenly became 
a rather viable tool for highly stabilised, medium-telephoto work.107 In 
short, it is now possible to do high-quality medium-range portraiture 
using widely available drones such as the Inspire 1 Pro. But technology 
has not surmounted all obstacles yet. The fact remains that large drones 
(that is, at least the size of the Inspire 1 Pro) are still needed for 
stabilised, high-quality imaging, and large drones are not just very 
visible, but very loud as well. It also remains a fact that large drones are 
still needed to counteract medium to strong winds; small drones would 
be blown away by the slightest of winds, or at the very least they would 
be extremely difficult to pilot. Both of these facts are governed by the 
basic laws of physics, and it would take some time before technology 
finds a solution or a workaround. In the meantime, therefore, the fear 
that pocket-sized drones can freely be used to spy on unsuspecting 
persons is an overblown one.108 The real issue, it seems, is not whether 
drones are likely to be used to spy on others since they are terribly 
ineffective in doing so, but whether drones can be flown in a way that 
affects an individual’s rights to enjoy certain spaces. In particular, can a 
person legally fly a drone over another person’s property? Does a 
homeowner own any airspace above his property?109 At what point does 
                                                          
106 DJI, “Zenmuse X5 Series Specs” <http://www.dji.com/zenmuse-x5s/info> 
(accessed 5 December 2016). 
107 The focal length of 90mm is considered at best belonging to the medium telephoto 
range, but it is a matter of time before the focal length (and sensor size) options 
increase. 
108 It is of course possible for a voyeur to pilot a mini drone into a person’s house, but 
at this point in time for a drone to be of a size to remain out of sight, the drone 
needs to have a very powerful and stabilised camera (relative to its size) – such 
technology is not available yet. When it does become available it may be necessary 
to see if such objects should be banned outright, if they serve no other purpose 
than to spy on others. 
109 A related issue is whether a drone may take off from a public area but fly over an 
area where flying is not allowed by the owner. In the US for instance, the National 
Park Service had unilaterally banned the flying of drones in its national parks, but 
(cont’d on the next page) 
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it become trespass (whether in the civil or criminal sense)? Looking at 
our own regulatory framework and related laws,110 there is no obvious 
answer. Perhaps this is yet another reason why it might be helpful to 
have proximity limits written into the law, so that this problem does not 
arise to begin with. 
30 Looking abroad, the approach taken in other jurisdictions is far 
from uniform. We have earlier seen in the example of the UK that 
drones that are fitted with cameras cannot be flown within 50m of 
persons or buildings.111 Unlike Singapore, the right to privacy is clearly 
established in the UK.112 The limit of 50m, however, appears to address 
the concern of safety (in that drones may crash into persons or 
buildings) and trespass (since homeowners are unlikely to own that high 
an amount of airspace) rather than privacy. This is because even with a 
camera with some degree of telephoto ability and a large sensor, the 
privacy of a person is unlikely to be infringed upon when the drone is 
no less than 50m away – any person captured in the footage of a drone 
flying past will barely be identifiable because of the distance (never 
mind the other critical ingredient to establish a breach, which is the 
intent of the user). But this will change eventually when drones can be 
equipped with cameras that have greater telephoto or zoom abilities 
without an over-compromise on sensor and gimbal sizes, so how should 
the conduct of drone users be regulated in a future-proof way? How is 
using a drone with telephoto abilities truly fundamentally different from 
someone who uses a telescope, binoculars or camera with a telephoto 
lens? Do drones really represent a significant privacy threat greater than 
the many technologies already woven in our lives without much 
resistance on our part, such as the metadata trails left on social media 
and e-commerce websites, dashboard cameras and CCTVs that capture 
a wide array of personal data every day, and smartphones with advanced 
                                                                                                                               
users have circumvented this unreasonable prohibition by taking off from outside 
the park. 
110 For instance, the Land Titles Act (Cap 157, 2004 Rev Ed) defines land to include 
“the column of airspace above the surface whether or not held apart from the 
surface as is reasonably necessary for the proprietor’s use and enjoyment”. 
111 It should also be noted that the concept of “freedom of panorama” remains 
protected in the UK. This may be another consideration behind the formulation of 
their rules. 
112 As part of its obligations under the European Convention on Human Rights, the 
Human Rights Act 1998 (c 42) (UK) came into force in 2000. Article 8(1) states: 
“Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his 
correspondence.” There are two points to note, however. First, there are plans to 
repeal the Human Rights Act. Secondly, the obligations in the Human Rights Act 
are as between the State and the people, rather than citizens inter se. Recourse to 
the right may thus be found only in the common law. 
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digital imaging and geolocation capabilities?113 There are no easy 
answers, and even the jurisdiction that is trying to lead the way has 
struggled with finding a fair solution. 
31 In the US, the Federal Aviation Administration (“FAA”), 
following years of deliberation and pressure from the full spectrum of 
lobbyists, finally released its first set of operational rules for drone users 
in the third quarter of 2016. Notably, while it came up with very specific 
regulations for drone safety, it was unable to come up with any rule 
relating to privacy.114 It pointed to the fact that even the National 
Telecommunications and Information Administration, which had more 
direct oversight over privacy rights per se, could only come up with a set 
of non-binding best practices on the issue.115 One explanation for this 
legal impasse is that while the right to privacy obviously receives 
protection in the US, it has to be counterbalanced against constitutional 
rights such as the freedom of expression, which entails a thick and broad 
conception and includes the right to fly drones for the purposes of 
gathering news, creating art and the like.116 What constitutes a 
reasonable expectation to privacy also varies greatly depending on the 
context,117 and the question of surface owners holding strict rights to 
exclude flying objects from invading the airspace above their land 
remains an unresolved one.118 It may thus take a while before the legal 
landscape in developed parts of the world changes for this aspect of 
drone regulation. To cite another example, Canada has essentially 
concluded that any foreseeable threat to privacy rights would emanate 
                                                          
113 See Parliament of Australia, “Eyes in the Sky: Inquiry into Drones and the 
Regulation of Air Safety and Privacy” <http://www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/ 
House_of_Representatives/About_the_House_Magazine/Previous/ATH48/Eyes_ 
in_the_Sky> (accessed 5 December 2016). 
114 Federal Aviation Administration, “DOT and FAA Finalise Rules for Small 
Unmanned Aircraft Systems” <https://www.faa.gov/news/press_releases/news_ 
story.cfm?newsId=20515> (accessed 5 December 2016). 
115 The guidelines are found at National Telecommunications and Information 
Administration, “Voluntary Best Practices for UAS Privacy, Transparency, and 
Accountability” <http://www.ntia.doc.gov/files/ntia/publications/voluntary_best_ 
practices_for_uas_privacy_transparency_and_accountability_0.pdf> (accessed 
5 December 2016). 
116 The First Amendment to the US Constitution reads: 
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or 
prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of 
the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the 
Government for a redress of grievances. 
117 See generally Taly Matiteyahu, “Drone Regulations and Fourth Amendment 
Rights: The Interaction of State Drone Statutes and the Reasonable Expectation of 
Privacy” (2015) 48(2) Columbia Journal of Law and Social Problems 265. 
118 See generally Troy Rule, “Airspace in an Age of Drones” (2015) 95(1) Boston 
University Law Review 155 and Michael Widener, “Local Regulating of Drone 
Activity in Lower Airspace” (2016) 22(2) Boston University Journal of Science and 
Technology Law 239. 
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from surveillance carried out by the Government (who would have 
exclusive access to military-grade drones that can fly for hours and have 
extremely sophisticated imaging technology), and not so much from 
recreational users.119 Hong Kong, in comparison, has concluded that 
recreational drones are even more intrusive than traditional surveillance 
devices, though privacy protection remains relatively nascent in the 
country.120 But to cite an extreme example, Sweden’s Supreme 
Administrative Court ruled just recently that any consumer drone that 
carries any camera presents an unacceptable threat to privacy as it is 
nothing but a tool for surveillance, effectively banning drones altogether 
and joining an ever-changing list of countries with regressive drone 
laws.121 If Singapore prefers to wait-and-see (as it usually does), there is a 
long way to go before any sort of international consensus or clear best 
practice emerges. This is not without consequence, however, as simply 
waiting and doing nothing about the current laws runs the risk of 
greatly reducing the number of users of drone technology. 
32 Ironically, amidst all the cacophony of how drones might assail 
privacy rights, it is easy to lose sight of the fact that drone users may 
potentially have their own privacy rights curtailed as well. Even more 
ironic is that such privacy rights are usually given robust protection in 
privacy-conscious jurisdictions. What then are these rights? It was 
mentioned earlier that the modern consumer drone is piloted with the 
help of an app developed by the drone manufacturer, and such an app 
contains plenty of data, including flight routes (based on GPS 
information), flight manoeuvres (based on flight control stick 
movements), flight parameters (duration, height, speed, distance, etc) 
and personal data of the pilot (smartphone identity, e-mail address, 
images and videos taken, etc). All of the data on the app is automatically 
synced to a cloud database owned by the manufacturer, so no 
opportunity to withhold consent arises,122 and it is immediately apparent 
                                                          
119 Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada, “Will the Proliferation of Domestic 
Drone Use in Canada Raise New Concerns for Privacy?” <https://www.priv.gc.ca/ 
en/opc-actions-and-decisions/research/explore-privacy-research/2013/drones_ 
201303/#heading-005> (accessed 5 December 2016). 
120 Office of the Privacy Commissioner for Personal Data, Hong Kong, “Guidance on 
CCTV Surveillance and Use of Drones” <https://www.pcpd.org.hk/english/ 
resources_centre/publications/files/GN_CCTV_Drones_e.pdf> (accessed 
5 December 2016). 
121 The Supreme Administrative Court of Sweden, “Tillstånd Lrävs för Kamera på en 
Drönare men inte för Kamera i en bil” <http://www.hogstaforvaltningsdomstolen. 
se/Om-Hogsta-forvaltningsdomstolen/Nyheter-fran-Hogsta-forvaltningsdom 
stolen/Tillstand-kravs-for-kamera-pa-en-dronare-men-inte-for-kamera-i-en-bil/> 
(accessed 5 December 2016). 
122 In the case of DJI, see DJI Forum, “DJI Go App Tutorials – How to Sync DJI Go 
Flight Records” <http://forum.dji.com/thread-60428-1-1.html> (accessed 
5 December 2016). 
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how such information can be used in many different ways – including 
possible abuse. If one of the principal difficulties of enforcing drone 
regulations is figuring out who flew what and where and when, this 
cloud database becomes an absolutely invaluable resource for 
investigative purposes. Indeed, the manufacturer may be tempted to 
grant the authorities access to the data if it is concerned about being able 
to continue selling its products in the country, and the authorities can 
conceivably justify access, at minimum, on the grounds of accountability 
and public safety.123 Having such access is much more advantageous 
than just having a drone owner registration system, which does nothing 
useful for investigating incidents or making users better pilots. The use 
of data generated by the drone app for the purposes of investigation and 
prosecution is definitely going to be another matter that legislatures 
worldwide have to grapple with for some time. 
C. Permits and permissions as a placebo 
33 We turn then to the third and final category of problems with 
Singapore’s current regulatory framework: the permits and permissions 
system. If the previous two sections were about sorting out the critical 
gaps in our regulatory framework for recreational users of drone 
imaging, this section is about the instances of (probably unintended) 
executive overreach and bureaucratic inefficiency in the framework that 
has the potential to paralyse the activity altogether within the next few 
years. After factoring in the aerodrome zones, and danger, prohibited 
and restricted areas – that is, without even including the protected and 
special event areas, which are gazetted on an ad hoc basis from time to 
time – the flyable areas for recreational users of drones in Singapore are 
fairly limited.124 Notably, these areas do not even yet include all of 
Singapore’s 304 parks, nature reserves and reservoirs which the National 
Parks Board (“NParks”) has declared, without any apparent consultation 
or input from stakeholders, to be absolutely off-limits to drones.125 The 
end result has been that recreational drone users are now effectively only 
allowed to congregate in the Marina Barrage and Marina Bay areas to 
fly, as no other truly viable spots have been identified and local users 
tend to err on the side of caution – but most of these users probably do 
not even realise that any sort of imaging done in the Marina Bay area 
actually requires approval and a hefty monetary deposit made to the 
                                                          
123 See also Personal Data Protection Act (Act 26 of 2012) Second Schedule. 
124 See Annex 3 below. 
125 National Parks Board, “Do’s and Don’ts” <https://www.nparks.gov.sg/gardens-
parks-and-nature/dos-and-donts> (accessed 5 December 2016). 
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Urban Redevelopment Authority.126 This is a rather bleak, if not patently 
absurd, state of affairs. The usual rejoinder to this is that if a user wants 
to fly in a greater number of locations and/or exceed the prescribed 
limits (such as altitude and weight), all he needs to do is to apply to 
CAAS for a permit. After all, one of the promises made when the 
Unmanned Aircraft (Public Safety and Security) Bill was debated was 
that CAAS would provide a fuss-free, one-stop solution for all permit 
applications.127 But is the permit system truly viable for most users? 
34 While it is true that CAAS has not gone down the extreme 
path of requiring all users of drones to earn pilots’ licences and 
certificates of expertise – as was once seriously contemplated by some 
jurisdictions128 – a perusal of the permit application form by CAAS is 
disheartening and would likely deter many users from even bothering to 
try seeking exemptions.129 Suppose a user wishes to fly at an extended 
height of 400ft (which is the limit adopted in most jurisdictions) or 
wishes to fly a small consumer-level drone for a private event for a small 
fee as a favour for a friend (which does not require any permit or 
certificate in other jurisdictions such as the European Union).130 
Regardless of whether this user is obtaining an operator permit (which 
is valid only for up to a year) or an activity permit (which is valid only 
for ad hoc events) so that he can be exempted from some of the default 
prohibitions, he needs to figure out the answers to a litany of highly 
technical questions, including: the precise co-ordinates of where he 
intends to fly, the full flight profile of the flight, a proposed list of safety 
measures employed to prevent the loss of control of the drone, 
a proposed list of contingency measures in the event of loss of power, 
loss of signal, and loss of line-of-sight, and 13 matrices of complex risk 
assessment, to name but only a few requirements in a form that spans 
22 pages. Further, for reasons unknown to the public, CAAS does not 
publish any ballpark of the costs and fees for any of its applications – 
presumably, the amount is only known to the applicant after each 
application has been processed. There is also no stated turnaround 
timeframe, as every application would (predictably) be treated on a 
case-by-case basis – but if prior statistics are anything to go by, the 
                                                          
126 Marina Bay, “Filming/Photography” <https://www.marina-bay.sg/organise-
events/filming-photography/filming-n-photography.aspx#tab-content> (accessed 
5 December 2016). 
127 Singapore Parliamentary Debates, Official Report (11 May 2015) vol 93. 
128 See for instance Ben Popper, “New FAA Rules Mean US Companies Can Fly 
Drones Without a Pilot’s License” The Verge (21 June 2016). 
129 Civil Aviation Authority of Singapore, “Application for Unmanned Aircraft 
Systems Permit” <http://www.caas.gov.sg/caas/en/PDF_Documents/Others/ 
CAAS_UAS_FormA.pdf> (accessed 5 December 2016). 
130 Adem Ilker, “Regulating Commercial Drones: Bridging the Gap Between 
American and European Drone Regulations” (2016) 15(2) Journal of International 
Business and Law 313 at 319. 
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success rate of applications has been fairly low and the turnaround time 
no less than a few weeks.131 It would be quite different if the application 
process was simple, expedient and only cost a nominal fee for non-
complex requests, but the current process is uniformly unpleasant for all 
types of requests. At bottom, the likelihood of being granted a permit is 
remote, the process is cumbersome and potentially costly, but most 
importantly, a system of permits and permissions misses the mark even 
if its purported raison d’être is to ensure safety and accountability – it is 
hardly a panacea to either of those concerns, and is little more than a 
placebo to assuage public fears. It presupposes that mishaps involving 
drones can largely be attributed to pilot error or pilot incompetence, but 
that is a questionable assumption in the light of the fact that drone 
crashes in earlier times were mostly down to machine malfunction but 
today, drone technology has evolved so much that drone safety is not 
much of an issue anymore. A permit system, in other words, only 
promotes accountability but does little for safety. A system that demands 
proven competence may help with safety, but may unduly chill or even 
freeze the activity altogether for many users. Thus, in formulating the 
regulations and their exemptions, instead of looking only at whether the 
activity in question is inherently risky and whether the pilot has great 
skill and experience, the regulators should be asking whether certain 
types of drones even present real dangers to begin with. 
35 Further, creating a system of permits and permissions fossilises 
a culture of rigid regulations, and bureaucrats have zero incentive to 
take a permissive approach over a restrictive one. Such a culture may 
arguably be more acceptable for something that is technologically 
agnostic, but will not work for something like drone technology which is 
evolving very quickly and is outpacing the development of the general 
regulatory framework. Further, users are already and will remain greatly 
deterred from continually reapplying for exemptions, and over time, the 
activity will inexorably die out. The experience of the US is instructive 
in these two regards. When FAA was first tasked to integrate drone 
airspace with the national airspace, its first reaction, as mentioned, was 
to require all drone pilots to possess a pilot’s licence. It quickly backed 
away from this unnecessary position, but not before insisting on a 
mandatory registration system (something which, to its credit, CAAS 
rejected);132 failure to register any drone greater than 250g could result 
in a jail term of three years and a fine of US$250,000. There was again 
backlash, first regarding the sheer disproportionality of the sanction for 
failure to register, and secondly regarding the potential breach of data 
                                                          
131 Lester Hio, “Up to 30% of Drone Permit Applications Rejected Last Month” The 
Straits Times (15 February 2015). Cf Amanda Lee, “700 Applications to Fly Drones 
Received” Today (4 February 2016). 
132 Lester Hio, “No Need for Drone Hobbyists Here to Register Their Devices: CAAS” 
The Straits Times (4 February 2016). 
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protection from the searchability of the registration database. FAA then 
tried to design a set of compulsory restrictions (such as those relating to 
altitude, line-of-sight and proximity to people) for flying, but realised 
that it was impossible to find a sensible consensus. Finally, FAA 
attempted to distinguish between recreational and commercial use, 
stating that for the latter, the pilot needed to pass an aeronautical 
knowledge test and be vetted by the Transportation Safety 
Administration. However, waivers for both commercial users and 
recreational users (to fly beyond the default prohibitions) could be 
applied for online in a hassle-free way, and naturally, many users took 
the route of waivers. The state of the law is still in flux at the moment, 
but it seems that the US is on the trajectory towards greater freedom, 
rather than greater restriction. Ultimately, the regulators realised that 
drone imaging, especially when carried out by small consumer drones, 
was (and still is) largely a harmless activity, and that all of the initial 
attempts to over-regulate only had the effect of shutting down the 
activity altogether. Further, it is also likely that FAA recognised the 
paradox that many regulators worldwide often fail to even realise: 
a person who wishes to fly for commercial gain is somehow required to 
obtain a permit, but why? This does not happen to non-aerial imagers. 
Market forces would dictate that only those with a credible flying record 
would be hired, but at the same time, the regulators believe that 
obtaining a permit would improve the safety of commercial fliers. In the 
final analysis, this is just another example of how the requirement of a 
permit meets no particular concern and will just be seen as, even if it 
was not intended to be, another government revenue stream. 
36 Going forward, Singapore is confronted with two choices, and 
these would be informed by the underlying philosophy adopted. If the 
philosophy is that drones and drone imaging are inherently dangerous 
and yield little benefit, then the system for permits and permissions 
should be as oppressive as possible so that, in effect, only the 
professionals and government agencies would end up utilising drones. 
As mentioned, it is not just CAAS that a user has to go through in 
seeking permits and permissions – for instance, would a CAAS permit 
trump an NParks ban on flying drones in their parks? If the philosophy 
is that drones and drone imaging can be used sensibly even by 
recreational users with tolerable risks and that there is much to be 
explored with this technology, then not only should the rules for flying 
be more precise and nuanced so that users can better regulate their 
conduct and the gradation of risks are better accounted for, a system for 
permits and permissions should be the exception rather than the 
norm;133 alternatively, the process for seeking exemptions or waivers 
                                                          
133 Based on what has been covered in this article, a tentative proposal of what a more 
nuanced set of regulations might look like is presented in Annex 4 below. 
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should be made affordable, expedient and flexible as regards aspects of 
the flight that may be relaxed (such as height limits, night flights and 
first-person-view supplemented by spotters) depending on the 
specifications of the drone in question (such as weight, imaging power 
and redundancies). At the same time, it might also be worth looking at 
whether the prescribed sentencing ranges are unduly harsh and whether 
they can be calibrated based on a broader range of factors rather than 
just categorisation of offence alone. 
IV. Recapitulation and concluding thoughts 
37 In summary, the author has attempted to demonstrate the 
following points in this article: 
(a) Certain prohibitions declared by CAAS, such as flying 
over roads and crowds, night flights and sole reliance on first-
person-view, find no obvious legal basis and may be interpreted 
as non-enforceable guidelines. 
(b) In any event, the general duty not to endanger the safety 
of persons, aircraft or property, while flexible, overly subsumes 
too many important limits that users may need clarity for to 
regulate their behaviour, such as distance, speed and proximity 
to persons and property. At the same time, the altitude 
restriction of 200ft is strict. In redesigning the law based on 
these various limits, variables such as the weight and the type of 
drones should be duly factored in. 
(c) For the foreseeable future, it is unlikely that drones 
would be the preferred tools for harassment, breach of data 
protection or surveillance. As for the right to privacy, even 
assuming it exists, the main areas of contention are likely to be 
about the airspace that a homeowner owns, and the balancing of 
rights. There is also a separate question of whether flight data, 
while useful for investigations if there are incidents, should be 
protected. 
(d) A system of permits and permissions should not be 
oppressive by default. Instead, it should complement the 
existing regulatory framework in a positive way. But to do so, 
the framework has to be better designed in terms of precision 
and nuance to facilitate proportionate regulation. 
38 With only around 700 square kilometres of land, Singapore is 
one of the smallest countries in the world. With a population of more 
than five million people, the island city-state is also one of the most 
densely populated, where high-rise buildings and large congregations of 
people are the norm rather than the exception in the urbanised areas. 
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And with one of the world’s highest rates of internet and mobile internet 
penetration, wireless interference is everywhere in Singapore. From this 
perspective alone, it may not seem to make sense to take an overly 
permissive approach with respect to the regulation of drones, 
considering too that Singapore is an aviation hub (complete with several 
military airbases) and there are many competing uses for its limited 
airspace on a daily basis. After all, what can possibly be worse than an 
aviation incident in a country as densely packed and littered with 
skyscrapers as Singapore? 
39 Fears of things flying in the sky, however, have to be grounded 
in reality, coupled with the clear cognisance of the drawbacks of shutting 
down a technological tool altogether and destroying important 
innovation and forms of expression. For instance, despite initial 
attempts by the media at fearmongering and sensationalising, numerous 
scientific studies and experiments have shown that most consumer 
drones do not actually pose any real risks to aircraft.134 This is not to say 
that the 5km buffer zone for aerodromes should be lifted – but the 
danger presented by drones, notwithstanding the extremely low odds, is 
not so much direct impact with the aircraft; instead, it is the tremendous 
and possibly dangerous inconvenience when runways are blocked by 
stray drones or when aircraft have to take evasive measures at the last 
minute. But the point that remains is that regulations need to make 
sense and be flexible where necessary, and should not be a result of 
either a blind adoption of rules from other places or an unthinking 
continuation of rules that had applied to different types of aerial 
vehicles. Singapore’s regulatory framework for recreational drone users 
is a self-contradiction in this sense, because the existing rules are unduly 
restrictive (breaches of which result in severe penalties), and the gaps 
highlighted in this article create an uncertainty that does not help make 
the activity a safer one. When the next phase of review of the regulatory 
framework comes about, it would be prudent to extensively consult all 
stakeholders – this article has only scratched the surface as to what is 
round the corner. 
 
                                                          
134 See for instance BBC, “Small Drone Risks to Aircraft ‘Minimal’”, 
<http://www.bbc.com/news/technology-33008257> (accessed 5 December 2016); 
Digital Trends, “New Research Suggests the FAA Exaggerates the Threat that 
Drones Pose to Planes” <http://www.digitaltrends.com/cool-tech/researchers-say-
faa-overestimating-small-drone-risk/> (accessed 5 December 2016). 
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